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FOURTH AMENDMENT-PRISON CELLS:
IS THERE A RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Hudson v. Palmer,1 the United States Supreme Court held for
the first time that the fourth amendment does not protect prisoners
from searches of their personal property by correctional officers.
2
The Court held that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in their prison cells that must be protected by the fourth
amendment.3 Although several circuits have recognized that pris-
oners have a "limited privacy right" in their prison cells entitling
them to the protection of the fourth amendment, 4 the Hudson deci-
sion eliminates any possibility that prisoners could invoke the fourth
amendment to protect their property from search or seizure by state
employees.
The Court in Hudson also extended its decision in Parratt v. Tay-
lor5 to intentional deprivations of property by state employees.
6
1 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
2 Id. at 3201.
3 Id. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in perti-
nent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... U.S.
CONsT. amend. IV.
4 Several circuits have held that. the fourth amendment guarantees prisoners the
limited right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See, e.g., United States
v. Chamorro, 687 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982) (search of the prisoner's cell and seizure of a
package label identical to one found on a bomb was conducted reasonably for valid
security reasons); United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (indis-
criminate search and reading of prisoner's confidential papers violates the fourth
amendment's standard of reasonableness where such reading was not necessary to fur-
ther institutional security); United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978) (prior
notice of body cavity searches conducted on prisoners is not necessary where prison
officials have reason to believe that the inmate is concealing contraband); United States
v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1977)' (the court would not suppress evidence ob-
tained in a prison search where probable cause existed and where the prisoner openly
kept his property in his cell); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), cerl.
denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978) (shakedown searches may be conducted without a warrant,
probable cause, or prisoner's consent; prisoner, however, may be entitled to compensa-
tion for the loss of his trial transcript where he can prove that the prison guards unrea-
sonably seized his property).
5 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
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The Parratt Court held that prison officials who negligently destroy
prisoners' property do not violate prisoners' property rights under
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause as long as the state
provides postdeprivation remedies. 7 The Hudson decision further
establishes that prison officials do not violate prisoners' fourteenth
amendment rights even when they intentionally destroy prisoners'
property.
This Note will examine the reasoning that underlies the Court's
unwillingness to grant a reasonable expectation of privacy to prison-
ers. This Note also will argue that the severity of the Supreme
Court's decision is justified by the legitimate institutional interests
of the penal facility.
II. BACKGROUND
The fourth amendment protects individual rights to privacy,
but its protection is not available to all members of society under all
circumstances.8 Most notably, the fourth amendment is not avail-
able to pretrial detainees or convicted prisoners to prevent searches
or seizures within their prison cells.9 The Supreme Court laid the
foundation for this restriction of prisoners' fourth amendment
rights in Lanza v. New York 10 when the Court held that a prison is not
6 See Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3204.
7 451 U.S. at 543. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in pertinent part: "[Nior shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8 See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 489 (1969) (an accused cannot
claim the protections of the fourth amendment where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminat-
ing object); United States v. Smallwood, 443 F.2d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 1971) (fourth
amendment protection is not available to corporate officials to prevent the use of corpo-
rate records against them); United States v. An Article of Food, Etc., 477 F. Supp. 1185
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (the exclusionary rule fashioned by the courts to protect the fourth
amendment rights of individuals is not available to a claimant in a condemnation pro-
ceeding brought in rem concerning the contraband itself).
9 In a case decided on the same day as Hudson, the Supreme Court held that the
jailer's practice of conducting shakedown searches of pretrial detainees' cells in the ab-
sence of the detainees was a reasonable response to legitimate security concerns and did
not violate due process. Block v. Rutherford, 104 S. Ct. 3227 (1984). The Supreme
Court enunciated the underlying reasoning for this decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520 (1979), where it held that pretrial detainees could not invoke the fourth amendment
to prevent room searches when the detainees remained outside their rooms while the
searches were conducted. The Supreme Court stated that "the room-search rule simply
facilitates the safe and effective performance of the search which all concede may be
conducted. The rule itself, then, does not render the searches 'unreasonable' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 441 U.S. at 557.
10 370 U.S. 139 (1962). In Lanza, the Supreme Court stated that a prisoner's due
process rights were not violated when state officials secretly taped an incriminating con-
versation between the prisoner and his brother and later used a transcript of that taped
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an area protected by the Constitution. 1 The Lanza decision noted
that because of the continual surveillance of inmates, a prison does
not meet the expectation of privacy inherent in a home or an of-
fice.12 Although the Court in Lanza was not required to decide the
applicability of the fourth amendment to prison inmates, it stated
that to give prisoners fourth amendment immunity from search or
seizure of their personal property is "at best a novel argument."'
3
The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States14 and Smith v. Mary-
land'5 established that the applicability of the fourth amendment is
contingent upon whether the individual can claim that a "legitimate
expectation of privacy" has been invaded by government actions.
16
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz stated that the test of reasona-
bleness for prison searches is "whether a prisoner's expectation of
privacy in his prison cell is the kind of expectation that 'society is
prepared to recognize as "reasonable."' "17
The Supreme Court has determined the reasonableness of
prison searches in several different ways. Prior to its decision in Bell
v. Wolfish, 18 the Supreme Court applied a case-by-case test of rea-
sonableness to searches conducted by state employees to determine
whether they violated the fourth amendment.' 9 The Court decided
the reasonableness of each search by balancing the need for the par-
ticular search against the personal rights that the search invaded.20
The Court in Bell, however, rejected the case-by-case reasona-
bleness test. Instead, the Court determined the reasonableness of
the contested searches in a categorical fashion. The Court argued
that "when an institutional restriction infringes a specific constitu-
conversation to interrogate the prisoner's brother before a legislative committee. Id. at
144.
11 Id. at 143.
12 Id.
'3 Id.
14 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Supreme Court decided that the fourth amend-
ment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures despite the lack of physi-
cal intrusion into the area being searched. Id. at 353. Consequently, the Government's
wiretapping of the complainant's telephone booth violated the fourth amendment be-
cause complainant reasonably relied on the privacy of his conversation. Id. For further
discussion of the Supreme Court's test in Katz, see infra text accompanying note 67.
15 442 U.S. 735 (1978). Justice Blackmun's opinion noted that police did not violate
the complainant's fourth amendment rights by installing a pen register on the complain-
ant's phone line without a warrant. Id. at 746. The Court noted that the complainant
had no actual or legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed. Id. at
742.
16 Id. at 740.
17 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3199 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
18 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
19 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.15 (1968).
20 Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
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tional guarantee. . . the practice must be evaluated in the light of
the central objective of prison administration, safeguarding institu-
tional security." 2 1 The Court found that shakedown searches of
prison cells help maintain security and preserve internal order and
discipline. 22 Relying on the categorical determination that prison
searches fulfill the government's objectives regarding prison secur-
ity, the Supreme Court in Bell held that the shakedown searches of
pretrial detainees are reasonable. 23 The Court in Bell also acknowl-
edged the plausibility of the argument that "a person confined in a
detention facility has no reasonable expectation of privacy with re-
spect to his room or cell and that therefore the fourth amendment
provides no protection for such a person." 24
Despite the Supreme Court's suggestion in Bell that prisoners
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells, several cir-
cuit courts have held that prisoners possess a "limited privacy right"
in their prison cells that prohibits unrefisonable searches and
seizures. 25 The Supreme Court in Wolffv. McDonnell26 noted that
prisoners are not "wholly stripped of constitutional protections
when [they are] imprisoned for crime." 27 From this statement, sev-
eral circuits reasoned that prisoners retain some fourth amendment
rights that are consistent with the legitimate demands of prison se-
curity. 28 In United States v. Hinckley,29 the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit held that under the fourth amendment, the reasonableness of
the search depends "on a balance between the public interest [in
maintaining institutional security] and the individual's right to per-
sonal security free from arbitrary interference." 30 The Court also
21 Id. at 547 (citations omitted).
22 Id. at 546; see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974); Martinez v. Procunier,
416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974). Justice Rehnquist noted in Bell that "central to all other
corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the correc-
tions facilities themselves." 441 U.S. a 546-47 (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 823).
23 Bell, 441 U.S. at 557.
24 Id. at 556-57.
25 See supra note 4 and cases cited therein.
26 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
27 Id. at 555. The Wolff decision allows prisoners to enjoy due process rights. See also
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (retention of first amendment rights of free
speech that do not inhibit legitimate instutional objective); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976) (eighth amendment protection is given to prisoners to prevent cruel and unu-
sual punishment); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam) (guarantees reason-
able opportunities to exercise religious freedom);Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969)
(reasonable access to the courts is guaranteed); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968)
(per curiam) (prohibits invidious racial discrimination, except where necessary for the
prison's security needs).
28 See supra note 4 and cases cited therein.
29 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
30 Id. at 129 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
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held that any deference given to prison administrators by courts
must be tempered by the fourth amendment's prohibition on unrea-
sonable invasions of privacy.
3 1
A related issue to the constitutionality of prison cell searches
and seizures is the constitutionality of postdeprivation remedies for
prisoners whose property was negligently or intentionally destroyed
by state employees. In Parratt v. Taylor,3 2 the Supreme Court con-
fronted the question of the adequacy of postdeprivation remedies
for prisoners whose property was negligently destroyed by prison
officials. In Parratt, an inmate alleged a violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment when a state employee negli-
gently lost the inmate's hobby materials.33 The Parratt Court held
that although a prison inmate was deprived of his property by the
negligent acts of a state employee, there was no violation of the due




Petitioner Hudson, a correctional officer at Bland Correctional
Center in Virginia, conducted a "shakedown" search 35 of the locker
and cell occupied by Respondent Palmer, an inmate. During the
search, Hudson destroyed some of Palmer's legal materials and cor-
respondence. 36 Subsequently, Palmer brought an action3 7 against
Hudson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,38 alleging that Hudson violated his
fourteenth amendment right by depriving him of his property with-
31 Id.
32 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
33 Id. at 531.
34 Id. at 541. In Parrall, the Court held that Nebraska's postdeprivation remedy for
persons who assert tort losses committed by the state is suffident to defeat due process
challenges. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 81-8,209-8,239 (1976). "Through this tort claims
procedure the state hears and pays claims of prisoners housed in its penal institutions."
Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543.
35 Brief on Behalf of Petitioner at 3, Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984). A
shakedown search is a security measure used by prison administrators. During a shake-
down search, inmates are cleared from their cells and a team of guards thoroughly
searches each room for contraband.
36 Brief for Respondent and Cross-Petitioner at 2, Hudson.
37 Palmer brought a pro se action against Hudson in United States District Court.
Palmer v. Hudson, No. 81-0290-A, mem. op. at 28 (W.D. Va. Nov. 17, 1981).
38 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), provides in pertinent part that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
1984] 613
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
out due process of law.3 9 Palmer asserted that Hudson searched
and intentionally destroyed his personal possessions in an attempt
to harass him.4
0
The United States District Court for the Western District of Vir-
ginia entered summary judgment against Palmer.4 1 The court
found that even if Palmer's allegations were true, Hudson had not
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
42
The district court recognized that the Parratt decision, which held
that a negligent deprivation of property by state officials does not
violate the fourteenth amendment if an adequate postdeprivation
state remedy exists, was applicable to the Hudson case.43 The district
court extended the holding of Parratt to a state employee's random
and unauthorized intentional destruction of a prisoner's property.
44
The court held that the postdeprivation remedies available to
Palmer under Virginia state law afforded him with adequate means
of redress for the lost property.
45
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's holding that Hudson did not violate
Palmer's due process rights.4 6 Relying on Parratt, the court held
that postdeprivation remedies for state employees' random and un-
authorized intentional acts satisfy the requirements of procedural
due process. 47 The court determined that, as with negligent acts
committed by state employees, predeprivation remedies for inten-
tional acts are not feasible because of the spontaneous nature of
such occurrences. 4 8 The postdeprivation remedies available to
Palmer under Virginia law adequately satisfy the mandates of proce-
The purpose of § 1983 is to "afford a federal right in federal courts because, by
reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be
enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immuni-
ties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies."
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
39 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3197.
40 Id.
41 Palmer, No. 81-0290-A, mem. op. at 34.
42 Id. at 30.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 31.
45 Id. When prisoners use Virginia's inmate grievance procedure, their claims may
be heard by an inmate-employee grievance committee or by the superintendent of the
institution. See Department of Corrections, Commonwealth of Virginia, Inmate Griev-
ance Procedures 6 (October 12, 1982). Tort and common law claims will be heard by the
judiciary of Virginia.
46 Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220, 1221 (4th Cir. 1983).
47 Id. at 1223. Procedural due process requires that parties whose rights are involved
in a controversy be given a hearing. Aggrieved parties also must be given adequate
notice before their claims are adjudicated. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1971).
48 Palmer, 697 F.2d at 1222. The state cannot provide a predeprivation hearing
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dural due process. 49 The court found that Virginia's postdepriva-
tion remedies provide parties whose rights are affected with a forum
that addresses grievances, thus fulfilling the requirement of proce-
dural due process that parties in interest be given a hearing.50
Because of a factual conflict regarding whether Hudson con-
ducted the search to harass Palmer,5' the court of appeals reversed
the district court's finding that Palmer was without any rights to pri-
vacy and remanded the case for further factual determinations.
52
The court of appeals held that prisoners have a limited privacy inter-
est,55 and consequently that they are protected from unreasonable
searches and unjustifiable confiscations. 54 Noting that the fourth
and fourteenth amendments protect inmates from arbitrary and op-
pressive invasions of personal privacy that harass the prisoners and
serve no legitimate institutional concerns, 55 the court concluded
that prisoners should be stripped only of those constitutional rights
that impair prison security or administration.5 6
before negligent or intentional deprivations of property occur because the state cannot
foresee when such acts will occur. Id. at 1223.
49 Id. The postdeprivation remedies available to prisoners in Virginia are state tort
law and common law remedies. The Supreme Court in Hudson noted that Virginia has
adopted a new inmate grievance procedure that will afford prisoners relief for any de-
struction of their property. 104 S. Ct. at 3202 n.9.
50 Palmer, 697 F.2d at 1222.
51 Id. at 1224.
52 Id. at 1225.
53 Id. at 1223-25; see United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1224; see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (Delaware's interest in
discretionary spot checks as a means of ensuring highway safety does not outweigh the
resulting unreasonable intrusion on the fourth amendment privacy interests of the per-
sons detained).
56 Palmer, 697 F.2d at 1224. The Supreme Court, for example, has approved of
prison officials' interference with prisoners' mail. The Supreme Court in Wolffv. McDon-
nell held that the prison officials' practice of opening inmates' mail in their presence
does not constitute censorship where the mail is read only by the inmates. 418 U.S. 539,
577 (1974). The Court stated that the possibility that contraband could be enclosed in
correspondence represents a sufficient security threat to the prison to justify an infringe-
ment on any first amendment rights the prisoners may have in receiving their mail. Id.
The Court will allow censorship of mail if it furthers the substantial governmental inter-
ests of security, order, and rehabilitation. In another case, the Court held that limita-
tions of first amendment freedoms must be no greater than are necessary or essential to
the particular governmental interest involved. Martinez v. Procunier, 416 U.S. 396, 413
(1974).
The Supreme Court also has allowed restrictions on the free exercise of religion
where the application of a state regulation is necessary to accomplish a compelling state
interest. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (imposition of social
security taxes on Amish people who object on religious grounds to receipt of public
benefits and to payment of taxes to support public benefit funds is not unconstitutional).
Although the Supreme Court has not determined what restrictions can be placed on free
exercise within prisons, the Seventh Circuit in Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954 (7th
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The court of appeals acknowledged that spontaneous shake-
down searches are an effective means of limiting the amount of con-
traband smuggled into prisons.57 The court, however, identified
only two situations in which prison officials may search the property
of specific individuals in their cells. 58 First, prison officials may con-
duct random searches pursuant to an established program that is
reasonably designed to deter or discover contraband. 59 Second,
prison officials may conduct individual searches when "some rea-
sonable basis exist[s] for the belief that the prisoner possess[es]
contraband."
60
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to con-
sider two issues. The first issue is whether prison inmates have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells entitling them
to the protection of the fourth amendment against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 6 1 The second issue is whether the Supreme
Court's decision in Parratt should extend to intentional deprivations
of property.
62
IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
In Hudson v. Palmer, a majority of the Supreme Court affirmed in
part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit. 63 First, the Court determined that a prison in-
mate has no "reasonable expectation of privacy enabling him to in-
voke the protections of the Fourth Amendment." 64 Second, the
majority found that intentional deprivations of property committed
by state employees violate the fourteenth amendment due process
clause if adequate postdeprivation remedies exist.6 5
To determine whether the prison officials interfered with the
inmate's privacy rights, the Court applied the test established in Katz
Cir. 1983), upheld the practice of conducting frisk searches of male inmates by women,
despite the fact that the practice violated the tenets of the inmate's Islamic religion. The
Court stated that the prisoner could not "expect the same freedom from incidental in-
fringement on the exercise of his religious practice that is enjoyed by those not incarcer-
ated." id. at 958.
57 Palmer, 697 F.2d at 1224.
58 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated in Palmer that if a prisoner
questions the validity of a prison search, the judiciary will determine if adequate grounds
existed to justify the search. Id. at 1221.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1225.
61 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3198.
62 Id. at 3202.
63 Id. at 3198.
64 Id. at 3202.
65 Id. at 3205.
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v. United States. 66 Under this test, a person can invoke the fourth
amendment right to privacy if the person demonstrates an actual
expectation of privacy and if society is prepared to recognize the
person's expectation as reasonable.
67
To apply the Katz test, the majority in Hudson first looked at the
circumstances of incarceration to determine whether prison inmates
have a legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy in their
cells. 68 The Hudson Court concluded that because a prison "shares
none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office,
or a hotel room,"' 69 the fourth amendment right to privacy is "fun-
damentally inconsistent" 70 with prisoners' living situations. In the
prison environment, inmates and their cells must be under close
surveillance to ensure institutional security and internal order. 7'
The Hudson Court found that the interest of prisoners in privacy
within their cells must yield to the accepted belief that "loss of free-
dom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement.
' 72
Next, the majority looked at the interests of society in maintain-
ing the security of its penal institutions to determine whether society
would accept a prisoner's expectation of privacy as reasonable.7 3
The Hudson Court found that society places an obligation on prison
administrators to provide an environment for inmates and prison
employees that is both secure and sanitary.74 In conjunction with
this obligation comes the prison officials' authority to "take all nec-
essary steps to ensure. . . safety" within the prison.75 Because un-
fettered access to prisoners' possessions allows prison officials to
detect contraband and thus reduce potential security problems, the
majority held that society would not accept prisoners' expectation of
privacy as reasonable.7 6 A protectable privacy interest for prisoners
would prevent prison officials from maintaining a secure prison.
66 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For a discussion of the Katz opinion, see supra note 14.
67 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
68 104 S. Ct. at 3199.
69 Id. at 3201 (quoting Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1962)). The Lanza
Court found that privacy was incompatible with the prison environment. 370 U.S. at
143. Within prison facilities, inmates are subject to constant surveillance and supervi-
sion and thus cannot exercise dominion over their surroundings. Prison showers, toilet
facilities, recreational areas, and sleeping quarters all are exposed to the general inmate
population and to prison administrators. Prisoners do not have any private areas that
are subject only to their individual control.
70 104 S. Ct. at 3198.
71 Id. at 3201.
72 Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)).
73 Id. at 3199.
74 Id. at 3200.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 3201.
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The Hudson Court, therefore, concluded that prisoners' expec-
tations of privacy cannot be deemed reasonable if society's interest
in the security of its prisons outweighs the prisoners' interest in pri-
vacy within their cells.7 7 The majority found that the court of ap-
peals erred in holding that prisoners have even a "limited privacy
right" in their cells. 78 The Hudson Court instead adopted a "bright
line" rule that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy in
their cells. 79 Accordingly, the fourth amendment proscription
against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply within the
confines of prison cells.
80
The second issue considered by the Hudson majority was
whether the court of appeals was correct in holding that the
Supreme Court's decision in Parratt should extend to intentional
deprivations of property by state employees acting under color of
state law.8 1 Guided by the fundamental goal of due process inquir-
ies-providing an opportunity for an aggrieved party to be heard at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner 82-the Hudson Court
applied the rationale underlying the Parratt decision to intentional
deprivations of property.
83
The Supreme Court found that because the state could not an-
ticipate random and intentional unauthorized conduct by its em-
ployees, the state could not provide remedies before the deprivation
occurs.84 In prior decisions, this Court has noted that "due process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands."'85 Guided by this principle, the Hudson Court
gave judicial notice to the impracticability of traditional predepriva-
tion remedies when random and unauthorized deprivations occur,
and it did not require such remedies. 86 The Hudson majority held
that when states provide adequate civil remedies for deprivations
that are committed by state employees, the procedural requirements
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment are
fulfilled.87
The Hudson Court also refused to uphold the limitations placed
77 Id.
78 Id. at 3197-98; see supra note 4 and cases cited therein.
79 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3198.
80 Id. at 3205.
81 Id.
82 See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
83 104 S. Ct. at 3202.
84 104 S. Ct. at 3203.
85 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1971).
86 104 S. Ct. at 3203.
87 Id. at 3204.
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on prison officials' use of random searches by the Fourth Circuit.88
As a result of its concern over the possibility that searches would be
conducted solely to harass inmates, the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals had required that prison officials conduct searches only when
they followed an established policy or when they had a reasonable
suspicion that prisoners were hiding contraband.8 9 Concluding that
the spontaneity of random searches increases their effectiveness, the
Hudson majority rejected the Fourth Circuit's decision.9 0 The
Supreme Court held that any inquiries by prisoners into the reason-
ableness of prison searches need not be addressed by the Court be-
cause prisoners have no fourth amendment protection against
unreasonable searches that are conducted by prison officials in a pe-
nal institution. 91
Justice O'Connor concurred in part with the Hudson decision.
Justice O'Connor agreed with the portion of the majority opinion
that held that search and seizure of inmates' possessions is legiti-
mate because incarceration eliminates individuals' fourth amend-
ment rights to privacy and possessory interests in personal effects. 92
Justice O'Connor argued, however, that prisoners' property is pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment due process clause and the
fifth amendment takings clause.93 These clauses mandate that the
government provide due process of law and just compensation for
any deprivations of property.9 4 Finding, however, that Palmer had
not demonstrated that Virginia's grievance procedure and state tort
and common law remedies were inadequate means of compensation
for the loss of Palmer's property, Justice O'Connor maintained that
no valid constitutional claim existed.9 5 Justice O'Connor thus
agreed with the majority's holding.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's conclu-
sion that Palmer's complaint did not allege a violation of his consti-
tutional right to procedural due process. 96 Justice Stevens
88 Id. at 3201.
89 Palmer, 697 F.2d at 1224; see supra text accompanying notes 58-60. See generally
United States v. Ready, 574 F.2d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1978) (prison searches do not
require specific cause when done pursuant to a routine that is reasonably designed to
promote institutional security).
90 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3201.
91 Id. at 3202.
92 Id. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
93 Id. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
94 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3207 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 3208 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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disagreed, however, with the majority's conclusion that society is
willing to accept the total revocation of the right to privacy and the
right to possessions that do not threaten the security of the prison.
9 7
Justice Stevens argued that even without a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, Palmer's possessory interests in his belongings are
protected by the fourth amendment.98 Justice Stevens stated that
the issue of reasonableness is inherent in fourth amendment inquir-
ies and should be decided by "balancing the intrusion on constitu-
tionally protected interests against the law enforcement interests
justifying the challenged conduct." 99 Justice Stevens also noted that
the prison official asserted "dominion and control" over Palmer's
property as a result of "taking and destroying it."100 The dissent
found that the prison official's conduct amounted to a seizure that
the majority should have evaluated to determine its
reasonableness. 101
To determine if the seizure was reasonable, the dissent bal-
anced the prisoner's privacy interests against the institutional inter-
ests fulfilled by seizures. 10 2 Justice Stevens first weighed the
prison's interest in seizing Palmer's legal papers.' 0 3 The correspon-
dence and legal papers that Hudson seized from Palmer were not
items of contraband and, therefore, posed no threat to the prison's
security. 104 Justice Stevens argued that although it is reasonable for
prison officials to conduct searches to ensure that a prisoner's cell
does not contain contraband, seizures that serve no legitimate insti-
tutional interests are unreasonable.1
0 5
The dissent next weighed prison inmates' privacy interests.
Justice Stevens found that nearly all correctional administrators dis-
courage prison guards from either seizing or destroying noncontra-
band property10 6 because institutional goals are not served when
97 Id.
98 Id. at 3209 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 3211 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 3209 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 3216 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority in Hudson, however, concluded
that the Court need not decide the reasonableness of the prison search because the
"Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison
cells." Id. at 3202.
102 Id. at 3211 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 3212 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
104 Id.
105 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 3213 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated, "I am unaware that any
responsible prison administrator has ever contended that there is a need to take or de-
stroy noncontraband property of prisoners. . . . To the contrary, it appears to be the
near-universal view of correctional officials that guards should neither seize nor destroy
noncontraband property." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent found authority for
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guards deprive inmates "of any residuum of privacy or possessory
rights." 10 7 Without privacy, inmates lose their sense of individual-
ity, they devalue themselves, and, consequently, they become more
violent and resistant to rehabilitative efforts.' 08 Justice Stevens ar-
gued that denying fourth amendment protection against unreasona-
ble seizures to prisoners declares that they "are entitled to no
measure of human dignity or individuality" and reduces them to
"little more than chattels."' 0 9 The dissent concluded by criticizing
the majority for sacrificing the constitutional principle of protection
of privacy rights for the sake of administrative expediency. 110
V. ANALYSIS
A. PRISONERS' PRIVACY RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In Hudson v. Palmer, the Court held for the first time that prison-
ers have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells
entitling them to the protection of the fourth amendment."' The
Supreme Court reached this result by correctly applying the two-
fold test set forth by Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States 1 2 and by
correctly evaluating the policies that support giving prison officials
wide-ranging deference'13 in their attempts to seek out and confis-
cate contraband that threatens the internal security of the prison.
Despite lower federal court decisons, Hudson is not a break with
precedent.
The Court rejected the assertion that the fourth amendment
could be invoked to protect the property of inmates from searches
by prison officals.' 1 4 In Katz, the Supreme Court adopted the view
that the interests protected by the fourth amendment were based
only upon an invasion of privacy rights; privacy rights can be pro-
tected under the fourth amendment only when individuals have a
reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy. 115 To determine
this argument in the Federal Bureau of Prisons' regulations (only noncontraband items
may be seized by prison officials). Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see 28 C.F.R. §§ 553.12-
553.13 (1983).
107 104 S. Ct. at 3214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens refers generally to Schwartz, Depriva-
lion of Privacy as a "Functional Prerequisite'" The Case of the Prison, 63 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOL-
OGY & POLICE Sci. 229 (1972).
109 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3215 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 3217 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Administrative expediency can be viewed as
unfettered access to the prison cells without a search warrant or probable cause.
111 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3200 (1984).
112 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
113 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
114 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200.
115 389 U.S. at 351; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). The Court in Smith
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whether prisoners' expectations of privacy are reasonable and are
protected by the fourth amendment, the Hudson majority balanced
society's interest in having a secure prison against the prisoners' in-
terest in maintaining privacy within their cells.
116
Although prisoners retain some of their constitutional rights
while incarcerated, 1 7 society is not willing to accept the idea that
prisoners' expectations of privacy within their cells are reason-
able. 818 The confinement of potentially violent and dangerous indi-
viduals poses an obvious threat to the safety of prison officials,
visitors, and other inmates. 1 9 In order to minimize the threat, the
Virginia legislature authorized the use of random shakedown
searches, the seizure of contraband, and the continual surveillance
of prison inmates. 120 Although not all searches of prison cells will
lead to the confiscation of contraband, they will act as a useful pre-
ventative measure to reduce potential security threats. 12 1 Society
accepts the loss of privacy as a natural incident of incarceration.
122
Consequently, society is not prepared to acknowledge that prisoners
have a reasonable expectation of privacy because this expectation
may reduce the level of internal order and security in penal
institutions. 1
2 3
held that "consistently with Katz. . . the application of the Fourth Amendment depends
on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or
a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been invaded by government action." 442
U.S. at 740.
116 104 S. Ct. at 3200.
117 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974); see also supra note 4.
118 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200.
119 The Hudson Court noted that violence within prisons is a growing problem. Chief
Justice Burger stated:
During 1981 and the first half of 1982, there were over 120 prisoners murdered by
fellow inmates in state and federal prisons. A number of prison personnel were
murdered by prisoners during this period. Over 29 riots or similar disturbances
were reported in these facilities for the same time frame. And there were over 125
suicides in these institutions. . . . Additionally, informal statistics from the U.S.
Bureau of Prisons show that in the federal system during 1983, there were 11 in-
mate homicides, 359 inmate assaults on other inmates, 227 inmate assaults on
prison staff, and 10 suicides. There were in the same system in 1981 and 1982 over
750 inmate assaults on other inmates and over 570 inmate assaults on prison
personnel.
Id. Any security measure implemented by prison administrators can only decrease the
amount of violence committed in prisons.
120 See VA. CODE §§ 53.1-25 to -26 (1950).
121 See supra note 9.
122 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200. The Bell Court held that "[w]hether it be called ajail,
a prison, or a custodial center, the purpose of the facility is to detain. Loss of freedom of
choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement in such a facility." 441 U.S. at
537.
123 The Supreme Court in Martinez v. Procunier stated that one of government's pri-
mary functions is:
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During the last decade, most federal courts erroneously con-
cluded that the fourth amendment gives prisoners a "limited privacy
right" that prohibits unreasonable search and seizure. 124 These de-
cisions did not recognize that the retention of the constitutional
right to privacy by prison inmates is inconsistent with the constant
surveillance of prisoners that is characteristic of penal institutions.
The Supreme Court in Wolffv. McDonnell held that although a pris-
oner's rights "may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the
institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of con-
stitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime."' 25 The
Wolff majority, however, added that prisoners' rights may be re-
stricted to accommodate the "institutional needs and objectives" of
prisons.' 26 A prison's need to maintain internal security certainly
justifies a restriction on prisoners' privacy rights.
In an environment where constant surveillance is "the order of
the day,"' 27 any expectation of privacy maintained by prisoners is
incompatible with the reasonable goals of the institution. 128 Unlim-
ited access to the prisoner's personal belongings allows the prison
officials to ferret out illegal drugs, weapons, or other contraband
that may endanger the security of the prison.' 29 Consequently,
seizure of contraband materials helps prison officials maintain a se-
cure facility.
The Supreme Court's decision to eliminate entirely a prisoner's
right to privacy is not wholly without precedent. Language from
previous Supreme Court decisions suggests the result in Hudson.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Bell v. Wolfish stated the "[i]t may well
be argued that a person confined in a detention facility has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy with respect to his room or cell and
that therefore the Fourth Amendment provides no protection for
such a person."' 30 The Lanza Court also doubted that the claim of
the preservation of societal order through enforcement of the criminal law, and the
maintenance of penal institutions is an essential part of that task. The identifiable
governmental interests at stake in this task are the preservation of internal order
and discipline, the maintenance of institutional security against escape or unauthor-
ized entry, and the rehabilitation of the prisoners.
416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974).
Society places its trust in government to ensure that these tasks are fulfilled. Any
practice that limits prison officials' access to inmates' cells would be inconsistent with
the completion of these tasks.
124 See supra note 4 and cases cited therein.
125 418 U.S. at 555.
126 Id.
127 Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).
128 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3201.
129 Id.
130 441 U.S. at 556-57.
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constitutional immunity from search or seizure in a prison would
succeed.1
3 1
In addition, the Supreme Court's approval of another more in-
trusive search technique suggests that the shakedown searches au-
thorized by Hudson are neither an unprecedented and impermissible
invasion of prisoners' fourth amendment rights nor an excessive re-
sponse to the security needs of prisons. In 1979, the Supreme
Court in Bell v. Woish upheld the practice of conducting routine
body cavity searches of pretrial detainees following contact visits
with individuals from outside the prison.13 2 The Bell Court stated
that body cavity searches were a way to discover and deter smug-
gling of weapons and drugs into the prison.' 33 The Court held that
the searches were a reasonable response to legitimate security con-
cerns, even though there had been only one reported attempt to
smuggle contraband concealed in a body cavity into the prison.
134
Because the body cavity searches were in response to prison security
needs, the Court held that such searches were not excessive intru-
sions upon prisoners' fourth amendment privacy rights.
The shakedown searches at issue in Hudson cannot be consid-
ered as more excessive intrusions of privacy rights than the cavity
searches upheld in Bell. The searches of prison cells involve only an
interference with items of property, whereas cavity searches involve
an examination of the internal areas of the human body. 135 Surely,
if the Supreme Court accepts the greater intrusion on personal pri-
vacy rights as constitutional, the lesser intrusion must also be valid.
Several lower courts have held explicitly that prisoners do not
have privacy rights that prohibit search and seizure by prison offi-
cials. The Virginia Supreme Court in Marrerro v. Commonwealth
136
held that the retention of privacy rights by prisoners would be "in-
consistent with the close and constant monitoring of inmates neces-
sary to preserve an institution's security."' 137 Both the Ninth
Circuit 13 8 and the Second Circuit13 9 decided that prisoners do not
131 370 U.S. at 143.
132 441 U.S. at 560. Inmates are subject to body cavity searches when they are in
contact with visitors or when they have been outside the close surveillance of prison
officials. Id.
133 Id. at 559.
134 Id. at 558.
135 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558 n.39.
136 222 Va. 754, 284 S.E.2d 809 (1981) (the trial court properly admitted into evi-
dence marijuana and a pipe containing marijuana that were seized in a search of an
inmate's dormitory locker).
137 Id. at 757, 284 S.E.2d at 811 (discussing Bell, 441 U.S. at 556-57).
138 See, e.g., United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 916 (1973) (inmate was convicted of presenting fraudulent income tax refund
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have sufficient privacy rights to prohibit search and seizure by
prison officials. These decisons indicate that the denial of fourth
amendment protection to prison inmates is an accepted practice.
The Supreme Court also based its decision in Hudson upon the
prudent policy of permitting officials to exercise broad discretion in
running the prisons. 140 Traditionally, courts afford wide-ranging
deference to the security decisions made by prison officials. 141 The
Supreme Court in Hudson was right to uphold the constitutionality
of shakedown searches where the prison administrators use their
discretionary power to order searches. In Bell, the Supreme Court
held that it would not substitute its judgment on matters of institu-
tional security and administration for that of "the persons who are
actually charged with and trained in the running" of prisons.142 The
Court realizes, therefore, that state prison administrators are in a
better position than the judiciary to assess the need for security
measures in their prisons.
Although the seizure and destruction of Palmer's noncontra-
band materials were unfortunate occurrences, these events do not
refute the conclusion that prisoners have no fourth amendment pri-
vacy rights in their prison cells. Palmer's legal materials and corre-
spondence were not items of contraband. 143 As such, the materials
posed no threat to the prison's internal security. 144 The arbitrary
seizure and destruction of noncontraband items achieve no reason-
able institutional purpose. 145 The specific facts in Hudson, however,
claims to the Internal Revenue Service with documentary evidence obtained from a war-
rantless search of the inmate's cell).
139 See, e.g., Christman v. Skinner, 468 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1972) (inmate's privacy rights
were not violated by the monitoring of his conversations with visitors).
140 104 S. Ct. at 3200.
141 Bell, 441 U.S. at 547. See also Block v. Rutherford, 104 S. Ct. 3227 (1984) (the
jail's policy of denying pretrial detainees contact visits is a reasonable means of restrict-
ing the introduction of drugs or weapons into the prison); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S.
460 (1983) (prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority to de-
termine whether inmates should be assigned to administrative segregation); Christman
v. Skinner, 468 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1972) (prison officials can place inmates in isolation
cells if they believe that it is necessary).
142 Bell, 441 U.S. at 562. The Supreme Court in Martinez v. Procunier stated that:
[m]ost [problems in prisons] require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the
commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the leg-
islative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are
ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration
and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of
realism.
416 U.S. at 405.
143 Palmer v. Hudson, No. 81-0290-A, mem. op. at 29 (W.D. Va. Nov. 17, 1981).
144 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3212 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145 Id.
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do not justify abandoning the practice of conducting random shake-
down searches and seizures.
Without unrestricted access to prison cells, prison officials will
be hampered severely in their efforts to seize dangerous items of
contraband. 46 Prison officials must be able to react immediately to
the daily security problems that arise in prisons. This objective
would be "literally impossible to accomplish" if inmates retained a
right to privacy in their cells.
147
Although the Hudson decision is broad, the Supreme Court is
not condoning the destruction of materials that are in the legitimate
possession of the prisoners. ChiefJustice Burger states that Hudson
does not mean that prisoners are without any remedies "for calcu-
lated harassment unrelated to prison needs. Nor does it mean that
prison attendants can ride roughshod over inmates' property rights
with impunity."' 48 Prisoners still may invoke the protection of the
eighth amendment against cruel and unusual punishment, various
state tort and common law remedies, and grievance procedures
within the prison. 149 Because a potential for abuse does exist as a
result of the Hudson decision, state legislatures, not the judiciary,
should enact stricter disciplinary actions against prison officials who
seize and destroy inmates' noncontraband possessions. Restrictions
on prison officials' access to prison cells, however, would be an ex-
treme and unreasonable response to the possibility that abuses will
occur.
B. EXTENSION OF THE PARRATT DECISION TO INTENTIONAL
DEPRIVATIONS OF PROPERTY
The Court properly concluded that the random and unauthor-
ized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does
not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment if a meaningful
postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.150 By extending its
decision in Parratt to intentional deprivations of property, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the spontaneous nature of both
negligent and intentional acts makes the predeprivation process
"impracticable."' 15 1 The Court reached this conclusion because it
found that states cannot anticipate or control the occurrence of such
146 Marrero, 222 Va. at 757, 284 S.E.2d at 811.
147 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200.
148 Id. at 3202.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 3204.
151 See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541.
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2
The Court in Hudson was guided by a desire to fulfill the proce-
dural requirement of the fourteenth amendment due process
clause. 153 Generally, the fourteenth amendment guarantees that
people will have access to the judiciary before the state deprives
them of their rights or property. 5 4 However, "due process is flexi-
ble and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situa-
tion demands."' 155  A state cannot provide the normal
predeprivation process where it cannot predict or anticipate the oc-
currence of spontaneous seizures.1 56 Consequently, the availability
of postdeprivation remedies to aggrieved parties satifies the man-
dates of procedural due process.
Palmer erroneously relied on Logan v. Zimmerman157 to support
the position that the deliberate seizure by Petitioner Hudson of Re-
spondent Palmer's property violated due process despite the availa-
bility of postdeprivation remedies. 158 In Logan, the Illinois Fair
Employment Practices Commission extinguished the complainant's
claim to entitlements under the Fair Employment Practices Act by
inadvertently scheduling his statutorily mandated factfinding con-
ference to take place five days after the expiration of the 160-day
statutory period. 159 In that situation, the Supreme Court found the
postdeprivation hearings "constitutionally inadequate."' 160 In Lo-
gan, the state, by operation of its laws, destroyed the complainant's
property interests.161
Hudson, however, is not such a case because Palmer's property
interests were not at stake. In Hudson, the deprivation occurred as a
result of the random and unauthorized intentional conduct of a state
employee. Logan is not controlling in a situation where a state em-
ployee, and not the operation of a state law, deprives an individual
152 Hudson, 104 S.Ct. at 3204.
153 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation of parole without a
hearing is a violation of the parolee's liberty interests that are protected by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
(Pennsylvania's replevin provisions were not valid under the fourteenth amendment be-
cause they deprive a possessor of property without due process of law by denying the
right to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken); Armstrong v. Manza,
380 U.S. 545 (1965) (failure to give a child's natural father notice of the pending adop-
tion proceedings of his daughter deprived him of his rights without due process of law).
154 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540.
155 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.
156 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3203.
157 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
158 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3204.
159 Logan, 455 U.S. at 426.




of property because the fourteenth amendment places the obliga-
tion on the state, not on the individual employee, to provide proce-
dural due process for aggrieved parties. The Court in Hudson was
right to extend its decision in Parratt to intentional deprivations of
property by state employees where adequate postdeprivation reme-
dies are available.
The postdeprivation remedies available to Palmer will compen-
sate him for the destruction of his property. Virginia provides tort
law remedies for property intentionally destroyed by state employ-
ees. 162 Under state tort law, Palmer's legal matters and correspon-
dence, which Hudson destroyed during the search, have little
pecuniary value. Any compensation given to Palmer under Vir-
ginia's tort remedies would probably not be substantially greater
than a recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.163 The Supreme Court
held that the fact that Palmer might not recover that same amount
under state tort law that he may have recovered under § 1983 is not
"determinative of the adequacy of the state remedies."'
164
VI. CONCLUSION
Prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their prison cells entitling them to the protection of the fourth
amendment. Although Hudson v. Palmer categorically denies a
prison inmate the right to privacy, the decision fosters the legitimate
interest of penal institutions by enhancing their internal security.
The Supreme Court's extension of Parratt v. Taylor to random and
unauthorized intentional deprivations of property by state employ-
ees ensures that states will provide remedies for any property loss
162 104 S. Ct. at 3204; see Elder v. Hollard, 208 Va. 15, 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967) (defend-
ant was not immune from liability for committing an intentional tort while performing
his duties as a state police officer).
163 Under § 1983, Palmer may recover compensatory or punitive damages. See City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247
(1978). See supra note 38.
164 104 S. Ct. at 3204. Palmer also argued that Hudson, in his capacity as a state
employee, could invoke sovereign immunity to bar Palmer's tort claims against him.
This argument is not definitive. Under Virginia law, "a state employee may be liable for
any intentional torts he commits." Elder, 208 Va. at 19, 155 S.E.2d at 372-73. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court in Elder held that "'as long as. . . [the state's] agents act legally
and within the scope of their employment, they act for the state, but if they act wrong-
fully the conduct is chargeable to them alone.' " Id. at 18, 155 S.E.2d at 372 (quoting
Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. 228, 22 S.E.2d 9, 11 (1942)). Sovereign immunity, therefore,
probably would not bar Palmer from recovering against Hudson.
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that may arise from improper, harassing searches in order to pre-
vent fourteenth amendment violations.
DARLENE C. GORING
